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ABSTRACT—In 2008, the SEC indicted Dallas Mavericks owner and media 
mogul Mark Cuban for insider trading based exclusively on information 
obtained while under an oral confidentiality agreement. The government 
argued that this agreement was sufficient to establish the necessary duty 
required under the misappropriation theory based on SEC Rule 10b5-
2(b)(1) passed in 2000. This Note argues that a confidentiality agreement is 
insufficient for establishing the requisite fiduciary or fiduciary-like 
relationship under the misappropriation theory. Further, this Note argues 
that the SEC’s attempt to circumvent the requirement for a fiduciary or 
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INTRODUCTION 
Controversy follows Mark Cuban, the 171st richest person in 
America,1 through many of his endeavors. Since his $280 million purchase 
of the 2011 NBA Champion Dallas Mavericks in 2000,2 Cuban has been 
one of the most divisive figures in the NBA.3 Over the course of his time as 
owner, Cuban has amassed well over one million dollars in fines for his 
brash behavior.4 Cuban’s television network, HDNet, has been at the 
 
1  See The Forbes 400: The Richest People in America, FORBES, Oct. 10, 2011, at 210, 236. 
2  Richard Hoffer, Dallas Maverick, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 6, 2000, at 80, 82. 
3  See generally Michael Lee, The NBA’s True Maverick: Swaggering Billionaire Is Having a Ball, 
WASH. POST, June 8, 2006, at E1 (outlining some of Cuban’s more memorable moments as a 
controversial figure in the sport, including his comment that “he wouldn’t hire Ed Rush, then the 
league’s director of officials, ‘to manage at a Dairy Queen’”—a comment that cost him $500,000 in 
fines). 
4  See Mark Cuban NBA Fines: 2000–2006, http://www.shmula.com/blog/timelines/cuban-
fines/cuban-fines.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2012) (providing a timeline of the fines Cuban received, 
amounting to $1.46 million, during Cuban’s first six years in the league). In 2009, Cuban was highly 
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forefront of contentious programming, most recently for teaming up with 
Joe Francis’s Girls Gone Wild for a risqué reality television show.5 Cuban 
drew criticism from the political arena as a producer of the movie 
Redacted,6 drawing a scathing letter from Congressman Duncan Hunter, 
Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, who called the film’s 
portrayal of American troops shameful.7 Cuban is no stranger to the 
courtroom, bringing high-profile lawsuits against Zuffa LLC in 20088 and 
the United Football League in 2011,9 and finding himself as a defendant 
against Ross Perot Jr. in a suit alleging that the Mavericks were being 
mismanaged by Cuban and his team.10 
And in 2008, Cuban had a run-in with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), which claimed that he had committed insider trading in 
violation of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act11 (the Exchange Act) 
and SEC Rule 10b-512 in 2004, when he sold his 6.3% stake in the Internet 
search engine company Mamma.com.13 The SEC based its claim on 
Cuban’s decision to trade shares after having made an oral agreement with 
the company’s CEO to maintain confidentiality regarding an upcoming 
securities issuance.14 While Cuban’s choice to agree to confidentiality and 
 
criticized for stating, “I’m not so against steroids . . . if it’s administered under the proper supervision.” 
Kevin Gorman, Cuban: ‘I’m Not So Against Steroids,’ PITTSBURGH TRIB.-REV., Oct. 21, 2009, at C12. 
5  See Leslie Snyder, Mark Cuban and ‘Girls Gone Wild,’ DALLASNEWS.COM (May 6, 2010, 10:29 
AM), http://tvblog.dallasnews.com/archives/2010/05/mark-cuban-and-girls-gone-wild.html. For an 
overview of the programming provided by HDNet, see HDNET, http://www.hd.net (last visited May 7, 
2012) (including shows such as Drinking Made Easy and Bikini Barbershop: Jersey). 
6  See REDACTED, http://www.redactedmovie.com (last visited Jan. 22, 2011) (listing Mark Cuban as 
an executive producer of the film). 
7  Sara A. Carter, War Film’s Portrayal of Soldiers Draws Fire from GOP Lawmaker, WASH. TIMES, 
Nov. 22, 2007, at A3. 
8  See Mark Cuban Sues Zuffa over Couture’s Contract, CAGE TODAY (Feb. 15, 2008), 
http://www.cagetoday.com/mark-cuban-sues-zuffa-over-coutures-contract. 
9  See Tom Huddleston Jr., The Mark Cuban Chronicles: Mavs Owner Sues UFL, AM LAW DAILY 
(Jan. 18, 2011, 9:00 PM), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2011/01/cubanufl.html. 
10  See Brendan Case & Gary Jacobson, Perot Sues Cuban, Says Mavs Insolvent, DALL. MORNING 
NEWS, May 11, 2010, at 1A. In 2011, after the Mavericks won the championship, Cuban’s legal team 
filed a motion for summary judgment showing simply a full-color picture of the Mavericks holding the 
championship trophy—a motion that one blog called the ultimate “fuck you” brief. Barry Petchesky, 
Mark Cuban Files the Ultimate “Fuck You” Legal Brief, DEADSPIN (June 22, 2011, 12:00 PM), 
http://deadspin.com/5814461/mark-cuban-files-the-ultimate-fuck-you-legal-brief; World Champion 
Dallas Mavericks and Radical Mavericks Management’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Hillwood 
Investment Properties III, Ltd. v. Radical Mavericks Management, LLC, No. 10-05639 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 
Dall. County, June 22, 2011). 
11  15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
12  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011). 
13  SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 717 (N.D. Tex. 2009), vacated, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010). 
14  See id. at 718. Liability for insider trading under § 10(b) is grounded exclusively on a 
confidentiality agreement derived from Rule 10b-5 and further clarified in Rule 10b5-2(b)(1), adopted in 
2000 as a response by the SEC to the courts’ narrow interpretation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 
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to subsequently trade may have been distasteful, this Note argues that his 
behavior was not actually illegal. 
From the original codification of insider trading law in § 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 to the development of the classical theory of insider trading in 
the early 1980s15 and the misappropriation theory in the late 1990s,16 two 
things have remained constant in analyzing liability. First, under § 10(b), 
the statute requires a “manipulative or deceptive device” to be used in 
“connection with the purchase or sale of any security” to give rise to 
liability.17 The SEC is limited in its statutory rulemaking authority by the 
language of the statute itself and therefore cannot create rules for the 
enforcement of § 10(b) that reach beyond the requirements for either 
“manipulative or deceptive” behavior.18 Second, case law regarding both the 
classical and misappropriation theories of insider trading mandates that, in 
the case of deception or manipulation caused by lack of appropriate 
disclosure in the context of a duty to disclose or abstain from trading, a 
fiduciary or fiduciary-like relationship gives rise to such a duty.19 
Because the SEC has focused increasingly on insider trading,20 
clarifying when such a duty to disclose or abstain exists has become an 
increasingly important issue for investor certainty.21 Three basic questions 
arise out of SEC v. Cuban: (1) Is existing case law sufficient to find that a 
confidentiality agreement on its own is enough to establish the requisite 
 
15  See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980). 
16  See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 650 (1997) (establishing the misappropriation 
theory as a basis for § 10(b) liability). 
17  15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
18  See Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). This is 
an oversimplification of Chevron deference analysis, which is given a broader explanation and 
discussion in the analysis of Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) infra Part IV. 
19  See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 666 (explaining the need for a breach of a recognized fiduciary or 
fiduciary-like duty to find liability); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983) (explaining that when an 
individual receives information from a source who he knows is breaching a fiduciary duty, the person 
then has a similar fiduciary duty); Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228 (requiring a fiduciary or similar 
relationship of trust or confidence). 
20  See SEC Insider Trading Cases Hit Record in 2008, REUTERS (Oct. 22, 2008, 12:58 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE49L65D20081022. 
21  See, e.g., Susan Pulliam et al., U.S. in Vast Insider Trading Probe, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20–21, 
2010, at A1 (outlining a massive three-year insider trading investigation by the SEC leading to potential 
widespread indictments as an example of the SEC’s heightened interest in insider trading). 
The wide scope of potential targets of insider trading scandals is seen in the indictments in 
connection with the Galleon Group scandal. Those indicted in the hedge fund insider trading case 
included the billionaire founder of the fund, a McKinsey & Co. consultant, a treasury manager at Intel 
Corp., and bankers from Morgan Stanley and Bear Stearns. This group is far from the corporate 
executive suite that one might picture in a traditional insider trading case. See Bob Van Voris et al., 2 
More Linked to Galleon Case, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 22, 2011, at D2; John Helyar, Galleon Insider-Trading 
Case Opens Window on Secret Hedge Funds, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 19, 2009, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a01GJ_ryEtms (outlining the original 
charges). 
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relationship for § 10(b) liability?; (2) If existing case law is not sufficient, 
was the SEC within its rulemaking authority to enact Rule 10b5-2(b)(1), 
explicitly making such a relationship adequate for a finding of liability?; 
and (3) If the SEC acted beyond its authority, should such a relationship, as 
a policy matter, be sufficient for such a finding of insider trading? 
Part I outlines the history of insider trading law, including the sources 
of the classical and misappropriation theories of insider trading, and 
describes additional cases that further develop the scope of liability under 
§ 10(b). Part II describes the Cuban case. Part III argues that the 
relationship between Cuban and Mamma.com is insufficient for insider 
trading liability under existing case law, and Part IV argues that the 
extension of the scope of insider trading liability to include such a 
relationship under Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) exceeds the scope of the SEC’s lawful 
rulemaking authority. Finally, Part V discusses the future of insider trading 
liability based exclusively on confidentiality agreements and why the 
extension of liability to reach these agreements is undesirable. 
I. THE STATUTORY BASIS AND CASE LAW DEFINING THE SCOPE OF 
INSIDER TRADING 
A. The Source of Insider Trading Law 
The Exchange Act regulates the secondary or post-distribution trading 
of securities.22 As the Supreme Court stated, Congress’s fundamental goal 
in securities regulation “was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for 
the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of 
business ethics in the securities industry.”23 Under § 10(b) of the Exchange 
Act and the SEC’s implementing Rule 10b-5, fraudulent activities are 
prohibited in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.24 The 
intent of the statute and the Rule is to require the periodic disclosure of 
inside information for the protection of the investors and to promote fair 
dealing in the trading of securities.25 
 
22  Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78nn (2006). For an overview of the 
Exchange Act and securities regulation generally, see JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 5–9 (6th ed. 2009). 
23  SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). 
24  15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (stating that it is unlawful for individuals “[t]o use or employ, in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in 
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors”); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006) 
(implementing this section of the Exchange Act). 
25  See Elizabeth Williams, Annotation, Recipients of Corporate Information Other than Directors, 
Officers, Substantial Shareholders, or Associated Professionals as Subject to Liability for Trading on 
Material, Nonpublic Information, Sometimes Referred to as “Insider Trading,” Within § 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b))—and SEC Rule 10b-5 Promulgated 
Thereunder—Making Unlawful Corporate Insider’s Nondisclosure or Manipulation of Information to 
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Although the statute does not explicitly prohibit the conduct commonly 
referred to as insider trading, the courts have used § 10(b) of the Exchange 
Act as the basis for restricting this practice.26 Section 10(b) of the Exchange 
Act restricts the use of a “manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance” 
“in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . .”27 To establish 
manipulative or deceptive behavior, the statute requires a showing of fraud 
or deceit.28 Generally, showing a misrepresentation of a material fact upon 
which another individual detrimentally relied is necessary to demonstrate 
fraud.29 In the case of insider trading, such a misrepresentation can occur 
either through a direct misrepresentation or by silence in the face of an 
obligation to speak.30 Based on the language in § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 
deceptive conduct is required to establish insider trading liability.31 
In the years since the adoption of Rule 10b-5, courts have developed 
two dominant insider trading liability theories: the classical theory and the 
misappropriation theory.32 The classical theory of insider trading focuses on 
the traditional idea of a corporate insider, while the misappropriation theory 
targets the deceptive misappropriation of information based on a fiduciary 
or fiduciary-like relationship of trust or confidence.33 The courts developed 
each of these tests to establish the presence of an affirmative obligation to 
speak or abstain from trading, which is the foundation for showing a 
deceptive practice. 
 
Seller or Purchaser of Corporation’s Stock, 14 A.L.R. FED. 2d 401, 411–12 (2006). For an overview of 
the potential detrimental effects of insider trading, see WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, 
INSIDER TRADING 24–39 (3d ed. 2010) (outlining the potential harms of ensuring an honest securities 
market to the corporation due to misaligned incentives, to an employer when that employer is not the 
stock issuer, and to the trading public due to wider bid–ask spreads). 
26  See Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94 IOWA 
L. REV. 1315, 1323 (2009); Williams, supra note 25, at 413. It is interesting to note that before the 
Exchange Act, there was no law to suggest that the act of insider trading was a breach of fiduciary duty, 
but the Senate Hearings regarding the 1934 Act faced the issue in a conclusive manner without 
significant debate. See S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 281 (1934). The practices were called “vicious” and 
“unscrupulous” in the Report of the Senate committee while prior to these hearings they had not been so 
demonized. Id.; see also 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF HENRY G. MANNE: INSIDER TRADING 18–19 
(Fred S. McChesney ed., 2009) [hereinafter MANNE]. 
27  15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
28  See Nagy, supra note 26, at 1323. 
29  See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977) (defining liability for fraud and 
explaining that the plaintiff must prove that the defendant “fraudulently [misrepresented a] fact, opinion, 
intention or law for the purpose of inducing [the plaintiff] to act . . . [causing] pecuniary loss . . . by his 
justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation”). 
30  Nagy, supra note 26, at 1323. 
31  See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011); see also Nagy, supra note 26, at 1323. 
32  See Williams, supra note 25, at 417. 
33  See Nagy, supra note 26, at 1324–36. 
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B. The Classical Theory of Insider Trading 
In 1980, the Supreme Court defined the “classical theory” of insider 
trading in Chiarella v. United States.34 The Court reaffirmed this theory 
three years later in Dirks v. SEC.35 Under the classical theory, a 10b-5 
violation occurs when a corporate insider trades in the securities of a 
corporation of which he is a director or employee (including an officer) 
when in possession of material nonpublic information.36 However, liability 
arises in violation of § 10(b) under the classical theory only if the trader: 
(1) owes a fiduciary duty37 to the other party in the transaction, (2) is an 
insider with a fiduciary duty to the corporation whose shares he is trading, 
or (3) is a tippee38 who knew or should have known that the insider who 
gave him information had breached a fiduciary duty in doing so.39 
Importantly, this means that the classical theory does not extend to 
individuals who are not insiders of the corporation and who did not receive 
the information from an insider.40 
In Chiarella, the Supreme Court considered the actions of a financial 
printer who was responsible for printing several corporate takeover bids.41 
Vincent Chiarella used the documents to deduce the names of the target 
corporations, which were otherwise concealed, and he subsequently used 
this information to trade in the stocks of the targets, realizing considerable 
profits.42 The Second Circuit upheld the district court’s conviction of 
Chiarella for violations of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.43 On appeal, the 
Supreme Court reversed the conviction, stating “that a duty to disclose 
under § 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market 
information.”44 Rather, the Court held that an individual must have a duty to 
 
34  445 U.S. 222 (1980). Before Chiarella, courts took an equal-access-to-information approach to 
insider trading. See, e.g., SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) 
(establishing a policy that required anyone who possessed material, nonpublic information to disclose it 
or abstain from trading on that information). 
35  463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
36  See Williams, supra note 25, at 412. 
37  A fiduciary is defined as “[a]n individual in whom another has placed the utmost trust and 
confidence to manage and protect property or money. The relationship wherein one person has an 
obligation to act for another’s benefit.” 4 GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 431 (3d ed. 2011). 
In the context of a corporate insider, this refers to the relationship that the corporate officers and 
employees have with the business’s owners or shareholders. 
38  A tippee is an individual receiving information from an individual with a fiduciary duty, even if 
the tippee himself may not have a fiduciary duty. 
39  See Nagy, supra note 26, at 1324–30. 
40  Id. at 1330. 
41  Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980). 
42  Id. 
43  See United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1362 (2d Cir. 1978), rev’d, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
44  Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235. 
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speak when an allegation of fraud is based on nondisclosure.45 This duty to 
disclose when an individual has information exists when “the other [party] 
is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust 
and confidence between them.”46 
Although there are five independent exceptions to the general common 
law rule that only statements are actionable as fraud,47 the Chiarella Court 
focused exclusively on the first exception: disclosure requirements based on 
the existence of a fiduciary or other relationship of trust and confidence.48 
The Court could have easily invoked some of the other exceptions, which 
do not require a fiduciary relationship, but the majority’s focus was 
exclusively on this fiduciary-based duty.49 This spotlight on the fiduciary 
requirement considerably narrowed the scope of potential insiders covered 
by Rule 10b-5 by narrowly looking at the traditional corporate insider, 
without providing room for broader liability that was available pre-
Chiarella.50 Although the Court did not explain its choice to focus only on 
this exception, it is suggestive of a narrower conception of who might be a 
potential insider. 
Three years after the Chiarella decision, the Supreme Court supported 
expanding the scope of individuals who could potentially be liable for 
insider trading.51 In Dirks, the Court explained that a tippee without a 
fiduciary duty to the shareholders could be liable if he knew or should have 
known that the source of information—the tipper—breached a fiduciary 
duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information.52 The Court, in 
characterizing the SEC’s argument, explained that any individual who 
“knowingly receives nonpublic material information from an insider has a 
fiduciary duty to disclose before trading.”53 Dirks focused on the tipper’s 
fiduciary duty, even though that duty was once removed from the tippee 
 
45  See id. 
46  Id. at 228 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1977)). 
47  The five independent exceptions offered in the Restatement are:  
(a) matters known to him that the other is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar 
relation of trust and confidence between them; and (b) matters known to him that he knows to be 
necessary to prevent his partial or ambiguous statement of the facts from being misleading; and 
(c) subsequently acquired information that he knows will make untrue or misleading a previous 
representation that when made was true or believed to be so; and (d) the falsity of a representation 
not made with the expectation that it would be acted upon, if he subsequently learns that the other 
is about to act in reliance upon it in a transaction with him; and (e) facts basic to the transaction, if 
he knows that the other is about to enter into it under a mistake as to them, and that the other, 
because of the relationship between them, the customs of the trade or other objective 
circumstances, would reasonably expect a disclosure of those facts.  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a)–(e) (1977). 
48  See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227. 
49  Nagy, supra note 26, at 1325–26. 
50  Id. at 1326. 
51  See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
52  Id. at 660. 
53  Id. at 656. 
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himself. In other words, the tippee’s choice to trade when he knew or 
should have known that the tipper was breaching a fiduciary duty created a 
derivative duty of disclosure for the tippee.54 Together, Chiarella and Dirks 
define the traditional scope of individuals facing potential insider trading 
liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 
Not all trades by a corporate insider who owes a fiduciary duty to 
shareholders are considered insider trading under the classical theory. 
Corporate insiders trade a significant amount of their own company’s stock 
well within the rules set forth in the statutes.55 However, when a corporate 
insider has material nonpublic information, the insider has a duty either to 
abstain from trading or disclose the information before trading.56 Therefore, 
under the classical theory, it is not sufficient to show that the trader simply 
was an insider in the corporation with a fiduciary duty to disclose or 
abstain. Instead, insider trading liability is predicated on a showing that the 
individual possessed material nonpublic information and traded securities 
without disclosing the undisclosed information to the public. In doing so, 
the insider has then breached his fiduciary duty.57 The classical theory 
remained the only insider trading theory endorsed by the Supreme Court 
until 1997, when the Court legitimized the misappropriation theory, 
allowing, among other things, insider trading liability for “outsiders” of 
corporations.58 
C. The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading 
Language in the Chiarella dissent and concurrence suggested that there 
was potential for a second theory of insider trading liability.59 In his dissent, 
Chief Justice Burger argued that the misappropriation of information 
obtained through fraud on the source of the information could be the basis 
 
54  Id. at 659. 
55  See 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (2006); Josef Lakonishok & Inmoo Lee, Are Insider Trades Informative?, 
14 REV. FIN. STUD. 79, 85 (2001) (finding that, in a typical year, insider trading accounts for 2% of 
small stocks and about 0.5% of large stocks). In fact, since trading by corporate insiders must be 
reported to the SEC, many traders in the general public use the information on these trades to guide 
personal trading strategy. See How to Legally Profit from Insider Trading!, INSIDERBUYINGEXPERTS, 
http://www.insiderbuyingexperts.com (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (providing a strategy to do trading 
based on insider trading of corporate officers). 
56  See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980); COX ET AL., supra note 22, at 884. 
57  See Nagy, supra note 26, at 1325. 
58  See id. at 1325–30; see also United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 650 (1997) (finding liability 
based on misappropriation for the first time). 
59  See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 238 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
Although the dissent by Chief Justice Burger and the concurring opinion by Justice Stevens both point in 
this direction, the majority opinion “repeatedly emphasized that the SEC should obtain statutory 
authority from Congress before proceeding to implement its expansive theories about the sorts of 
corporate acts that constitute securities fraud.” JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, 
POLITICS, AND POLICY 60 (1991). 
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for § 10(b) liability.60 Justice Stevens, in his concurrence, agreed that 
although it was not properly pleaded in Chiarella, fraud on the source of the 
information could be a viable basis for insider trading liability.61 Soon the 
SEC, supported by some courts of appeals, began using this theory of fraud 
on the source of information by a corporate outsider in subsequent insider 
trading cases.62 
In 1997, the Supreme Court embraced the misappropriation theory of 
insider trading in United States v. O’Hagan.63 Under the version of the 
misappropriation theory embraced by the Supreme Court, a corporate 
outsider can be found liable under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when a fiduciary 
profits from a securities transaction based on the undisclosed use of 
material nonpublic information obtained from a principal.64 The O’Hagan 
Court explained that the misappropriation theory of liability is premised “on 
a fiduciary-turned-trader’s deception of those who entrusted him with 
access to confidential information.”65 In finding liability under these 
circumstances, the Supreme Court endorsed, for the first time, the idea that 
liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is not limited to traditional corporate 
insiders. Rather, liability can also reach an individual who has access to 
confidential information through a fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty and 
breaches that duty by misappropriating that information to trade securities 
for a profit.66 Under this theory, the deception is not on the other party in the 
securities transaction; it is on the source of the information. 
In O’Hagan, the respondent was a partner at Dorsey & Whitney, a law 
firm hired to represent Grand Metropolitan PLC in a potential tender offer 
for Pillsbury Company’s common stock.67 James O’Hagan was not working 
on the deal.68 However, using the nonpublic knowledge of the potential 
tender offer that he had gained through his position at the firm, O’Hagan 
purchased 2500 call options for Pillsbury stock, more than any other 
 
60  See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (reasoning that the “broad language [of 
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5] negates the suggestion that congressional concern was limited to trading by 
‘corporate insiders’ or to deceptive practices related to ‘corporate information’”). 
61  See id. at 238 (Stevens, J., concurring) (explaining that “[r]espectable arguments could be made” 
to support a liability theory based on fraudulent activity toward the source of the information). 
62  See COX ET AL., supra note 22, at 888; see, e.g., United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d 
Cir. 1981) (applying the misappropriation theory from Burger’s dissent in Chiarella). 
63  521 U.S. 642. 
64  See id. at 652–53; see also Nagy, supra note 26, at 1317–18. O’Hagan was not the first time the 
Supreme Court discussed the misappropriation theory after Chiarella. In Carpenter v. United States, 484 
U.S. 19 (1987), the Court upheld a conviction from the Second Circuit premised on the misappropriation 
theory. But the decision was split evenly on an eight-member Court, so the decision had no precedential 
effect. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 25, at 416–17. 
65  O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652. 
66  Nagy, supra note 26, at 1317–18. 
67  O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647. 
68  Id. 
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individual investor, as well as 5000 shares of Pillsbury common stock.69 
Through these transactions and the eventual tender offer, O’Hagan made a 
profit exceeding $4.3 million.70 The Department of Justice brought a fifty-
seven-count indictment against O’Hagan, alleging that he defrauded his law 
firm and his client by using inside information to profit through personal 
trading.71 In reversing the holding of the Eighth Circuit, the Supreme Court 
endorsed the misappropriation theory, explaining that the theory fulfills the 
statutory requirements for “(1) using any deceptive device (2) in connection 
with the purchase or sale of securities.”72 
First, the Court assessed whether O’Hagan used a deceptive device in 
the securities transactions. Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, 
explained that although O’Hagan had not directly deceived the other party 
involved in the options and stock trades, when a fiduciary pretends loyalty 
to a principal for the purpose of secretly converting the principal’s material 
nonpublic information into personal gain, fraud has occurred on the 
principal.73 The deception under the misappropriation theory, according to 
the Court, was akin to embezzlement—“the fraudulent appropriation to 
one’s own use of the money or goods entrusted to one’s care by another.”74 
By using the confidential information gained through the fiduciary 
relationship for personal gain without disclosure to the source, the fiduciary 
deceives the source for § 10(b) purposes. 
The Court then addressed the question of whether the deceptive use of 
the information was in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. In 
finding a connection between the deceptive device and the trading of 
securities, the Court explained that the “element is satisfied because the 
fiduciary’s fraud is consummated, not when the fiduciary gains the 
confidential information, but when, without disclosure to his principal, he 
uses the information to purchase or sell securities.”75 By using a fiduciary 
relationship to gain material nonpublic information and then, without 
disclosure, by using that information as the basis for trading securities, the 
connection was formed between the deceptive device and the trade.76 
Without the trade itself, mere possession of the information would not 
violate securities law.77 
 
69  Id. at 647–48. 
70  Id. at 648. 
71  Id. 
72  Id. at 651. 
73  Id. at 653–54. 
74  Id. at 654 (quoting Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27 (1987)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
75  Id. at 656. 
76  See id. 
77  See id. 
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The decision in O’Hagan established that outsider liability under 
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is “limited to those who breached a recognized 
duty” owed to the source of the material nonpublic information.78 
Referencing the term fiduciary seventeen times,79 the Court grounded its 
decision on the fraud committed on the investors who were owed the duty 
and rejected an approach to liability that was not dependent on a recognized 
duty.80 The O’Hagan Court explained that a theory that was not grounded in 
a recognized duty would be overly broad.81 
Unfortunately, the O’Hagan Court did not make any serious attempt to 
define what actually constitutes the fiduciary or fiduciary-like relationship 
required for finding liability. The Court in O’Hagan began with the 
assumption that all lawyers are fiduciaries and, as fiduciaries, owe a duty to 
refrain from using a client’s confidential information without disclosure to 
the client; accordingly, the misappropriation theory applies to all 
fiduciaries.82 The ABA Model Rules state: “A lawyer shall not use 
information relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the 
client unless the client gives informed consent . . . .”83 Assuming that this 
rule states a lawyer’s fiduciary responsibility to a client, it is unclear, 
without further investigation, whether O’Hagan violated this duty because 
not all trading by an attorney is inherently disadvantageous to a client.84 
Lawyers are not restricted from all trading in clients’ securities, but only 
from that trading which would disadvantage the clients. The Court’s 
approach falls short in providing an adequate definition of fiduciary (or of 
similar relationships of trust or confidence), and it therefore becomes 
essential to look beyond O’Hagan to identify who is a fiduciary for the 
purpose of misappropriation theory liability. 
D. Defining Fiduciary Duty in the Context of Insider Trading 
Because O’Hagan fails to define a fiduciary or fiduciary-like 
relationship for § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability, it is necessary to scour 
other sources for a definition. Before the SEC enacted Rule 10b5-2 
(discussed infra), the Supreme Court did not provide a clear explanation of 
 
78  Id. at 666. 
79  Nagy, supra note 26, at 1332. 
80  See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655 n.6. Chief Justice Burger’s theory in Chiarella proposed that “a 
person who has misappropriated nonpublic information has an absolute duty to disclose that information 
or to refrain from trading.” Id. (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 240 (1980) (Burger, 
C.J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
81  See id. 
82  See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, SECURITIES LAW: INSIDER TRADING 123 (2d ed. 2007). 
83  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(b) (2011). 
84  BAINBRIDGE, supra note 82, at 123. 
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what constituted a fiduciary-like relationship. Therefore, the most useful 
source of guidance comes from appellate court precedent.85 
United States v. Chestman is the leading case examining the nature of a 
fiduciary-like relationship.86 The defendant, Robert Chestman, was a 
stockbroker working for Keith Loeb, the husband of one of the members of 
the Waldbaum family, owners of Waldbaum, Inc.87 Despite a series of 
promises of confidentiality among the Waldbaum family, Loeb eventually 
learned from his wife of a pending sale of the company to the Great Atlantic 
and Pacific Tea Company (A&P).88 He discussed this information with his 
broker, Chestman, revealing that he had knowledge of the impending sale 
of Waldbaum at a price “substantially higher” than market price.89 
Chestman then used this information to purchase shares for himself, as well 
as for several clients.90 Chestman was convicted of ten counts of securities 
fraud under Rule 10b-5, and his conviction was reversed on appeal.91 The 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, en banc, vacated the panel’s decision and 
reversed the Rule 10b-5 convictions.92 
To assess liability, the court examined whether Keith Loeb owed a 
fiduciary duty to his wife, which he then violated by tipping off Chestman 
and trading Waldbaum stock.93 Without finding the requisite fiduciary duty 
there could not have been any way to establish a duty for Chestman to 
disclose or abstain, resulting in no liability under Rule 10b-5. To determine 
whether a fiduciary duty existed, the court first noted that “a fiduciary duty 
cannot be imposed unilaterally by entrusting a person with confidential 
information,” even when the parties are aware of the confidentiality of the 
 
85  Although the term fiduciary may be defined under state law, state law is not a good source for a 
definition because inconsistencies between states would create significant problems with uniform 
enforcement of the federal securities laws. Therefore, United States v. Chestman serves as an example of 
how some appellate courts have interpreted fiduciary-like relationship. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en 
banc). Although Chestman is a Second Circuit opinion, this case is cited by several other circuits (as 
well as by the Court in O’Hagan), suggesting the persuasiveness of the definition articulated by the 
Chestman court. 
86  947 F.2d 551. See, e.g., Simon DeBartolo Grp., L.P. v. Richard E. Jacobs Grp., Inc., 186 F.3d 
157, 169 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Chestman in an insider trading case to outline the definition of fiduciary 
duty); SEC v. Talbot, 430 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1046 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (citing Chestman to define fiduciary 
duty); United States v. ReBrook, 837 F. Supp. 162, 167 (S.D. W. Va. 1993), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
58 F.3d 961 (4th Cir. 1995) (defining fiduciary); see also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 82, at 79–85 (using 
Chestman to outline the nontraditional fiduciary relationship). 
87  See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 555. 
88  See id. 
89  Id. 
90  Id. 
91  Id. at 556. Chestman was also convicted for ten counts of fradulent trading in connection with a 
tender offer (under Rule 14e-3(a)), ten counts of mail fraud, and one count of perjury. Id. 
92  Id. at 571. The en banc panel of the Second Circuit also reversed the mail fraud convictions but 
affirmed the convictions for fraudulent trading. Id. 
93  See id. at 570–71. 
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information.94 The court further explained that “marriage does not, without 
more, create a fiduciary relationship.”95 Therefore, the exchange of 
confidential information between a husband and wife, on its own, does not 
create a fiduciary duty. 
The Chestman court next assessed whether a “similar relationship of 
trust and confidence” existed between Loeb and his wife that amounted to 
the “functional equivalent of a fiduciary relationship.”96 Turning to Black’s 
Law Dictionary, the court explained that a fiduciary relationship is defined 
as one in which “the business which he transacts, or the money or property 
which he handles, is not his own or for his own benefit, but for the benefit 
of another person, as to whom he stands in a relation implying and 
necessitating great confidence and trust on the one part and a high degree of 
good faith on the other part.”97 The beneficiary of the relationship relies on 
the fiduciary to act for his benefit by entrusting him with custody over 
property—here, inside information.98 The court explained that, by obtaining 
the property to serve the relationship, the fiduciary “becomes duty-bound 
not to appropriate the property for his own use.”99 
In the case of Keith Loeb and his wife, the court found that the 
relationship did not have the necessary qualities of discretionary authority 
and dependency.100 The government failed to prove that Keith Loeb 
received the information because of any type of business relationship. 
Rather, the information was “gratuitously communicated to him” by his 
family.101 The government further failed to show any level of influence or 
reliance in the relationship between the couple.102 A fiduciary duty was not 
created simply by telling a party not to share the information.103 In 
Chestman, the court made a clear distinction between an individual who 
 
94  Id. at 567. The court discussed Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1980), 
where the Second Circuit found that Morgan Stanley was not liable for trading on confidential 
information regarding a takeover because no preexisting agreement to maintain confidentiality existed. 
Chestman, 947 F.2d at 567. The Court in Dirks accepted the reasoning in Walton, explaining that Walton 
turned “on the court’s determination that the disclosure did not impose any fiduciary duties on the 
recipient of the inside information.” Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 n.22 (1983). 
95  Chestman, 947 F.2d at 568. 
96  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
97  Id. at 568–69 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 564 (5th ed. 1979)). 
98  See id. 
99  Id. at 569. 
100  See id. at 571. The court compared the relationship of Loeb and his wife to the facts of United 
States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev’d, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985), an earlier case 
where the court found that a fiduciary-like relationship existed between father and son. See Chestman, 
947 F.2d at 569. The Court distinguished the two cases because, in Reed, the family members repeatedly 
shared confidential information. See id. When family members discuss business affairs frequently, a 
fiduciary-like relationship may be established. See id. 
101  Chestman, 947 F.2d at 570. 
102  Id. 
103  See id. at 570–71. 
106:1849 (2012) SEC v. Cuban 
 1863
acquires information and an individual who, through his relationship with 
the tippee, has a fiduciary duty to disclose or abstain due to the existence of 
the functional equivalent of a fiduciary relationship.104 Under the Chestman 
analysis, without an explicit expectation that the tippee will not use the 
information for his own benefit, a fiduciary-like relationship does not exist. 
E. Rule 10b5-2: Defining the Scope of the Misappropriation Theory 
The case law developing the misappropriation theory provided a 
piecemeal analysis of liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 rather than a 
systematic approach to analyzing outsider trading liability. O’Hagan 
explained that a fiduciary or fiduciary-like relationship is required for 
insider trading liability105 and Chestman defined such a fiduciary-like 
relationship.106 In 2000, the SEC promulgated Rule 10b5-2, a nonexclusive 
rule that established the scope of liability under the misappropriation theory 
by seeking to define a fiduciary or fiduciary-like relationship.107 Rule 10b5-
2 deems a “duty of trust or confidence” to exist in the following situations: 
(1) Whenever a person agrees to maintain information in confidence; 
(2) Whenever the person communicating the material nonpublic information 
and the person to whom it is communicated have a history, pattern, or practice 
of sharing confidences, such that the recipient of the information knows or 
reasonably should know that the person communicating the material nonpublic 
information expects that the recipient will maintain its confidentiality; or 
(3) Whenever a person receives or obtains material nonpublic information 
from his or her spouse, parent, child, or sibling . . . .108 
Noticeably lacking in Rule 10b5-2 is a requirement of finding a 
fiduciary or fiduciary-like relationship for liability. Rather, the language 
suggests a broader scope under which liability for insider trading could be 
established. Some commentators have suggested that this becomes 
particularly apparent by comparing the language of Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) to the 
language used by the Supreme Court.109 While Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) references 
 
104  See id. at 568. 
105  United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997). 
106  See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 568–70. 
107  Duties of Trust or Confidence in Misappropriation Insider Trading Cases, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-
2 (2011). See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7787, Exchange Act 
Release No. 42,259, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,209, 71 SEC Docket 732 (proposed Dec. 
20, 1999) (proposing release of 10b5-2). 
108  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b). 
109  See Amended Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 2, SEC v. 
Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (No. 3:08-cv-02050), 2009 WL 1257407. Allen Ferrell, 
the Greenfield Professor of Securities Law at Harvard Law School, wrote the brief, and Stephen 
Bainbridge, the William D. Warren Professor of Law at UCLA Law School; M. Todd Henderson, an 
Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School; Alan R. Bromberg, a University 
Distinguished Professor of Law at SMU Dedman School of Law; and Jonathan R. Macey, the Sam 
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a relationship of “trust or confidence,”110 the Chiarella and O’Hagan courts 
specifically required a relationship of “trust and confidence.”111 Although 
there is only a subtle distinction in the language, this distinction suggests 
that Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) is broader than O’Hagan’s articulation of the 
misappropriation theory.112 
F. Questioning the SEC’s Rule 10b5-2 
Although several courts113 have questioned the validity of the SEC’s 
Rule 10b5-2 since it was promulgated, none have actually invalidated it. 
However, this Note argues that in light of these questions, the validity of 
Rule 10b5-2 should not be presumed. 
In 2003, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals commented, in dicta, 
on the validity of 10b5-2(b)(3).114 In SEC v. Yun, the court considered Rule 
10b5-2(b)(3), which creates a presumed duty to abstain or disclose arising 
from spousal communication.115 The Yun court noted that “the SEC’s new 
rule goes farther than we do in finding a relationship of trust and 
confidence.”116 Ultimately, the court found a relationship of trust and 
confidence based on a history of the husband and wife sharing business 
information,117 but articulated the necessity of completing this analysis 
based on particular facts rather than presuming such a relationship based on 
the fact of marriage alone.118 By finding that the prior case law did not 
provide a basis for a presumption of such a relationship, this ruling suggests 
that the court believed that Rule 10b5-2 reached beyond the scope of 
§ 10(b).119 
 
Harris Professor of Corporate Law, Finance, and Securities Regulation at Yale Law School, all signed 
the brief. Id. at 3. 
110  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (emphasis added). 
111  United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997) (emphasis added); Chiarella v. United 
States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (emphasis added). 
112  Prominent members of the academic community suggested in a brief to the district court in the 
Cuban case that this was the case. See Amended Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 109, at 2. 
113  See, e.g., SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d 
1006, 1015 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (stating, in contrast to the language of Rule 10b5-2, that “an express 
agreement can provide the basis for misappropriation liability only if the express agreement sets forth a 
relationship with the hallmarks of a fiduciary relationship”). 
114  See Yun, 327 F.3d at 1273 n.23. 
115  See id. 
116  Id. 
117  Id. at 1273–74. Similar to the father and son in United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev’d, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985), where family relationships alone were not 
sufficient to find a fiduciary-like relationship, the business relationship between the family members 
created such a relationship. 
118  See Yun, 327 F.3d at 1272–73. 
119  See Thomas Lee Hazen, Identifying the Duty Prohibiting Outsider Trading on Material 
Nonpublic Information, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 881, 895 n.75 (2010) (coming to the same conclusion 
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In United States v. Kim, a California federal district court examined a 
relationship where an expectation of confidence was based solely on a 
history, pattern, and practice of sharing confidential information.120 In doing 
so, the court implicitly questioned whether Rule 10b5-2(b)(2) exceeds the 
SEC’s rulemaking power. The trader in Kim was a member of the Young 
Presidents’ Organization.121 The organization’s principles stated that the 
members’ forums “operate in an atmosphere of absolute confidentiality.”122 
The defendant then traded on information gained while under this 
expectation of privacy.123 The Kim court found that the mutual expectation 
of confidentiality was insufficient to establish the relationship of trust and 
confidence needed for liability under § 10(b).124 The court stated that “an 
express agreement can provide the basis for misappropriation liability only 
if the express agreement sets forth a relationship with the hallmarks of a 
fiduciary relationship detailed [in Chestman].”125 Because the court asserted 
that the dismissal in Kim was mandated under § 10(b), the logical end is 
that Rule 10b5-2 must be considered overbroad, reaching beyond the scope 
of its statutory source.126 
Neither Yun nor Kim go so far as to invalidate any section of 10b5-2. 
Rather, these cases signify that the validity of Rule 10b5-2 should not be 
assumed, but rather is an open question for the courts. 
II. SEC V. CUBAN QUESTIONS THE VALIDITY OF RULE 10B5-2(B)(1) 
On November 17, 2008, the SEC filed a complaint for insider trading 
against Mark Cuban after he sold his 6.3% stake in the Internet search 
company Mamma.com.127 The complaint alleged that “Cuban 
violated . . . Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934 . . . and Rule 10b-5 
thereunder” by trading securities while employing a deceptive device.128 
The SEC asked the court to: (1) enjoin Cuban from engaging in future 
violations of these provisions; (2) require Cuban to disgorge the losses that 
he had avoided; and (3) require Cuban to pay civil penalties under the 
 
regarding the court’s language in Yun regarding the SEC reaching beyond the scope of § 10(b) with Rule 
10b5-2(b)(3)). 
120  184 F. Supp. 2d 1006 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
121  See id. at 1008. 
122  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
123  See id. at 1008–09. 
124  See id. at 1015. 
125  Id. 
126  See Hazen, supra note 119, at 896 n.78 (reaching the same conclusion as Kim, explaining that the 
court’s decision forces the conclusion that the court believes that “Rule 10b5-2(b)(2) is overbroad since 
the SEC cannot by rule extend the scope of the statute”). 
127  Complaint at 1, SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (No. 3:08-CV-2050), 2008 
WL 4901149. 
128  Id. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1866 
statutory provisions involved.129 The district court dismissed the case on a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted.130 However, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded for 
additional fact-finding on the issue of whether Cuban had actually agreed to 
nonuse rather than only agreeing to confidentiality.131 This case signified the 
first time that a court questioned the SEC’s power in promulgating Rule 
10b5-2(b)(1). 
A. The Facts 
In March 2004, Mark Cuban purchased a 6.3% stake, or 600,000 
shares, in Mamma.com.132 Mamma.com was a Canadian company that ran 
an Internet search engine and was publicly traded on the NASDAQ.133 Later 
in 2004, “Mamma.com decided to raise capital through a PIPE offering,”134 
and chose to invite its largest known shareholder, Cuban, to participate in 
the offering.135 The CEO began his telephone conversation with Cuban by 
explaining that he had confidential information to convey, to which Cuban 
replied that he would keep the information in confidence.136 The CEO then 
informed Cuban of the impending offering.137 
Cuban reacted to the information with concern that the offering would 
dilute the existing shareholders’ (including his own) stake.138 Cuban ended 
the call saying, “Well, now I’m screwed. I can’t sell.”139 The CEO took this 
to mean that Cuban would not sell his shares until after the PIPE offering 
announcement.140 Over the next few days, Cuban proceeded to sell his entire 
stake in Mamma.com without informing the company of his intention to 
sell.141 Subsequent to Cuban selling his shares, Mamma.com publicly 
 
129  See id. at 8. 
130  See SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 731 (N.D. Tex. 2009), vacated, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 
2010). 
131  See Cuban, 620 F.3d at 558. 
132  Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 717. 
133  Id. 
134  Id. A private investment in public equity (PIPE) offering is defined as: 
A private investment firm’s, mutual fund’s or other qualified investors’ purchase of stock in a 
company at a discount to the current market value per share for the purpose of raising capital. 
There are two main types of PIPEs—traditional and structured. A traditional PIPE is one in which 
stock, either common or preferred, is issued at a set price to raise capital for the issuer. A 
structured PIPE, on the other hand, issues convertible debt (common or preferred shares). 
Private Investment in Public Equity—PIPE, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/
pipe.asp (last visited Nov. 16, 2010). 
135  Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 717. 
136  Id. 
137  Id. 
138  Id. 
139  Id. 
140  See id. 
141  Id. at 718. 
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announced the PIPE offering.142 The company’s stock fell 9.3% in the wake 
of the announcement,143 and the stock price continued to decline in the 
following days.144 In total, Cuban avoided losses in excess of $750,000 by 
selling his shares before the PIPE offering was publicly announced on June 
29, 2004.145 Following the PIPE offering, Cuban filed required SEC 
disclosure statements of the sale and publicly stated that he had sold the 
shares because of the impending PIPE offering.146 
B. The District Court Ruling 
In Cuban’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, Cuban argued that: (1) the SEC failed to allege that he 
engaged in insider trading based on its failure to allege that Cuban had the 
required fiduciary or fiduciary-like relationship and (2) Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) 
was invalid as applied to create liability in the absence of any fiduciary or 
fiduciary-like duty.147 Although the district court held that a relationship that 
gives rise to insider trading liability under the misappropriation theory need 
not bear all of the hallmarks of a traditional fiduciary relationship, a mere 
promise of confidentiality is not sufficient to create the fiduciary-like 
relationship needed for liability.148 With regard to the second argument, the 
court held that applying Rule 10b5-(b)(1) to predicate § 10(b) liability on a 
mere confidentiality agreement exceeds the SEC’s authority under the 
Exchange Act and therefore cannot be relied on for finding liability.149 
The district court first examined whether the SEC pled a relationship 
sufficient for finding § 10(b) liability.150 Under Chiarella and O’Hagan, the 
court recognized that both the classical and the misappropriation theories of 
 
142  Id. 
143  Jonathan Stempel, Court Revives Mark Cuban Insider Trading Case, REUTERS (Sept. 21, 2010, 
6:32 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/21/us-sec-cuban-lawsuit-idUSTRE68K33E20100921. 
144  Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 718. 
145  Id. 
146  Id. 
147  Memorandum of Law of Mark Cuban in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 1–2, SEC v. Cuban, 
634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex 2009) (No. 3:08-CV-2050), 2009 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 42203. 
The motion also addressed two questions beyond the scope of this Note. First, Cuban argued that the 
definition of fiduciary or fiduciary-like relationship is a matter of state law, or, in the alternative, a 
fiduciary or fiduciary-like relationship was inadequately pled under federal common law. See id. 
Because the court essentially dismissed this issue, it is not discussed in this Note. Cuban also attempted 
to argue that Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) only applies to family and other personal relationships. See id. Since the 
court jumped directly to arguing that Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) cannot properly rely on a mere confidentiality 
agreement to establish liability under the misappropriation theory, it did not discuss this argument. See 
Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 728 n.9. The court did mention that, “[w]ere the court to reach this 
question, . . . it would . . . reject such a limitation on Rule 10b5-2(b)(1)’s reach.” Id. 
148  Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 726. 
149  See id. at 730–31. 
150  See id. at 722–24. 
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insider trading demand deception for liability.151 The Cuban court explained 
that “O’Hagan teaches that the essence of the misappropriation theory is the 
trader’s undisclosed use of material nonpublic information that is the 
property of the source, in breach of a duty owed to the source to keep the 
information confidential and not to use it for personal benefit.”152 The court 
also noted that O’Hagan’s “unmistakabl[e]” focus on the need for 
deception in the misappropriation theory is further strengthened by 
O’Hagan’s explanation that liability can be foreclosed through the 
disclosure of the intention to trade.153 This, according to the court, makes it 
clear that trading cannot be deceptive under the misappropriation theory 
without a legal duty to refrain from trading without disclosure.154 
While Cuban claimed that a fiduciary or fiduciary-like relationship is 
required under the misappropriation theory, the court found alternative 
reasons that the relationship required for § 10(b) liability did not exist in 
this case. The court explained that O’Hagan’s view of misappropriation is 
grounded in the undisclosed breach of a duty not to use someone else’s 
information for personal benefit.155 This concept provides “no apparent 
reason why that duty cannot arise by agreement.”156 Therefore, the requisite 
fiduciary-like relationship may still be found even though the basis for the 
potential obligation is an agreement. Rather, the court looks more closely at 
the terms of the agreement to find the lack of a sufficient relationship of 
trust and confidence. In doing so, the court concluded: 
The agreement, however, must consist of more than an express or implied 
promise merely to keep information confidential. It must also impose on the 
party who receives the information the legal duty to refrain from trading on or 
otherwise using the information for personal gain. . . . A person who receives 
material, nonpublic information may in fact preserve the confidentiality of that 
information while simultaneously using it for his own gain. . . . Absent a duty 
not to use the information for personal benefit, there is no deception in doing 
so.157 
The court further explained that in the context of a nonuse agreement, 
the trader has created a duty for himself to disclose or abstain, but the 
source’s subjective belief that the recipient is not going to trade in the 
context of an agreement only not to disclose is insufficient to give rise to a 
duty.158 A unilateral understanding by the party providing information that it 
will not be used for trading does not create a duty with an explicit 
 
151  See id. at 722–23. 
152  Id. at 723. 
153  Id. 
154  See id. 
155  Id. at 724. 
156  Id. 
157  Id. at 725. 
158  Id. 
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agreement to not trade.159 Additionally, the court explicitly rejected the 
proposition in Chestman and Kim that an association requires one party to 
have superiority or exercise control or dominance to find the requisite 
fiduciary or fiduciary-like relationship.160 Therefore, although an agreement 
may be sufficient to create the duty needed for finding liability under the 
misappropriation theory, a mere confidentiality agreement, without a 
provision not to trade, falls short of creating such a duty. For an agreement 
without a pre-existing fiduciary or fiduciary-like relationship to be 
sufficient to establish liability, it must create a duty to disclose or abstain, 
such as in an agreement for nonuse. 
The district court also addressed the question of whether Rule 10b5-
2(b)(1) is sufficient to establish a duty giving rise to liability under the 
statute. The court began by asserting that “[t]he SEC’s rulemaking authority 
under § 10(b) is bounded by the statute’s proscription of conduct that is 
manipulative or deceptive.”161 Prior case law establishes that a necessary 
component of the misappropriation theory is a duty to not trade without 
disclosing while aware of the confidential information.162 Therefore, the 
court explained that it must begin by looking at the plain meaning of 
§ 10(b) and “the language and design of the statute as a whole” to 
understand whether Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) can appropriately serve as a basis for 
the misappropriation theory.163 
The court concluded that Rule 10b5-2(b)(1)’s creation of liability 
under the misappropriation theory is outside of the scope of the plain 
language of the statute: 
The agreement specified in the Rule—“to maintain information in 
confidence”—relates merely to preserving . . . confidentiality . . . . The word 
“maintain” captures the obligation to keep the information in its existing state, 
and the modifying phrase “in confidence” indicates that the state to be 
preserved is its confidentiality. Nothing in Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) requires that the 
agreement encompass an obligation not to trade . . . .164 
The court further explained that this reading of Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) is 
consistent with the language of the remainder of Rule 10b5-2.165 Each of the 
other two clauses outlines express or implied undertakings to maintain 
 
159  Id. Chestman is quoted at this point in the decision for the premise that “a fiduciary duty cannot 
be imposed unilaterally by entrusting a person with confidential information.” Id. (quoting United States 
v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 567 (2d. Cir. 1991)). 
160  See id. at 726–27. 
161  Id. at 728. 
162  See id. at 728–29. 
163  Id. at 729 (quoting K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988)). 
164  Id. at 730. 
165  Id. 
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confidentiality without requiring further agreement not to trade on that 
information.166 
The court concluded that Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) reaches beyond the bounds 
of § 10(b) by predicating liability on a mere confidentiality agreement.167 
Such a rule creates insider trading liability when the trader has no duty not 
to trade.168 The court explained that “it is the undisclosed use of confidential 
information for personal benefit, in breach of a duty not to do so, that 
constitutes the deception.”169 Therefore, the government cannot rely on Rule 
10b5-2(b)(1) to impose liability under § 10(b). 
C. The Fifth Circuit Remands 
On September 21, 2010, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals filed its 
opinion regarding the SEC’s appeal. The Court of Appeals ultimately did 
not find it necessary to rule on either of the issues addressed by the lower 
court. Rather, the court found that “the statement, ‘Well, now I’m screwed. 
I can’t sell’ [could] plausibly be read to express Cuban’s view that learning 
the confidences . . . forbade his selling his stock before the offering.”170 The 
court reasoned that this statement, combined with Cuban’s subsequent 
requests for information regarding the PIPE offering, was sufficient to 
establish a plausible basis for finding that there was not simply a 
confidentiality agreement between Cuban and the CEO of Mamma.com, but 
rather there was an implied agreement not to trade.171 The court suggested 
that it was at least plausible, for surviving a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, that 
Mamma.com only shared the information based on an agreement, even if 
only implied, to not use the information for personal benefit.172 
Interestingly, the SEC never made this argument, but rather focused on the 
confidentiality agreement as the basis for the necessary relationship. One 
might assume that this suggests that the SEC was attempting to use the 
Cuban case, one with particularly egregious facts, as a test case for this 
particular rule. 
Rather than ruling on the district court’s assessment of whether a 
relationship of trust or confidence existed or the validity of Rule 10b5-
2(b)(1), the court of appeals vacated the judgment and remanded for further 
proceedings and discovery to assess the possibility that the agreement 
between Cuban and the CEO went beyond a mere confidentiality 
agreement.173 Therefore, the question of liability based on a confidentiality 
 
166  See id. 
167  See id. at 731. 
168  See id. 
169  Id. 
170  SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551, 557 (5th Cir. 2010). 
171  Id. 
172  Id. at 557–58. 
173  Id. at 558. 
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agreement or the SEC’s ability to extend the scope of § 10(b) to include this 
type of situation remains open.174 The next two Parts of this Note provide an 
assessment of how courts should address the questions that the Fifth Circuit 
left open.175 
III. ABSENT SEC RULE 10B5-2(B)(1), CASE LAW PRECLUDES LIABILITY 
UNDER A MERE CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT 
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act provides that it is unlawful for a 
person “[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device” in violation of any SEC 
rule adopted under the section.176 Rule 10b-5 was promulgated under the 
statute pursuant to the SEC’s rulemaking authority to promulgate “such 
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”177 Taken 
together, the statute and the SEC’s rule state that an individual cannot 
manipulate or deceive in connection with securities trading. However, when 
a deceptive device has been used in trading is not clear. Rather, the 
definition of deception in this context is murky at best. 
Both the classic and misappropriation theories of insider trading are 
grounded in the existence of a fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty between the 
source of the information and the trader.178 After the mandate for a fiduciary 
or fiduciary-like relationship, the next inevitable question is when a 
fiduciary-like relationship exists. The widely used analysis from Chestman 
requires that, for a relationship of trust and confidence to be sufficient for 
liability, it “must be the functional equivalent of a fiduciary relationship.”179 
The Chestman court focused on the fact that the tipper entrusts the tippee 
with information for the purpose of serving the ends of the fiduciary 
relationship.180 By having this information entrusted to him, the fiduciary 
 
174  This story has an interesting epilogue. On October 22, 2010, Bloomberg reported that Mark 
Cuban offered to pay the SEC’s lawyers to help speed up the process of reviewing documents for the 
case to be heard again in the district court. See William McQuillen, Cuban Offers to Hire Lawyers to 
Review SEC Documents, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 22, 2010, 12:55 PM), http://webfarm.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=conewsstory&tkr=CF1:GR&sid=aigyjdc.H5Fs. The current schedule provided by the SEC 
has document review running until March 2012, and therefore, Cuban has offered to help hire contract 
attorneys to push along the process. See id. To date, the SEC has rejected the offer, suggesting that if it 
were to allow Cuban to do so, it would suggest that individuals with deep pockets would be able to push 
along the legal process where less wealthy individuals could not. See id. 
175  This Note does not approach the question that the court of appeals posed in its opinion of 
whether these questions actually even apply in Cuban. Rather, this Note ignores the argument that there 
may have been an implied nonuse agreement making Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) a moot point. 
176  15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
177  Id.; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011). 
178  See supra Part I.B (explaining the requirement for a fiduciary or fiduciary-like relationship under 
both theories). 
179  United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d. Cir. 1991) (en banc); see supra Part I.D. 
180  See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 568. 
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then wields a level of influence and control over the tipper because the 
tipper depends on the tippee to not trade.181 The opinion states that, simply 
by providing an individual with material nonpublic information, the 
requisite duty of trust and confidence is not created.182 To find a similar 
relationship of trust and confidence, it is necessary to find the “principal 
characteristics of a fiduciary relationship—dependency and influence.”183 
Under this definition, a mere confidentiality agreement would be 
insufficient to create the essential relationship needed to establish § 10(b) 
liability. Under the Chestman analysis, a confidentiality agreement alone 
could not create a level of authority or dependence on the part of the 
information source. By agreeing to confidentiality, the potential trader is 
agreeing to not share that information with others. He is not agreeing to use 
the information solely for the benefit of the source of the information. One 
could argue that by trading, the tippee is disclosing the information to the 
public. While this may be true for a very large trade, a smaller trade would 
likely go unnoticed by the public, especially if the trade is made by an 
individual who is not required to report his trades as an executive of the 
company. This is in contrast to a nonuse agreement, where the tippee 
explicitly agrees to not trade. Although a nonuse agreement does not create 
a duty to act solely in the interest of the tipper, it does create a direct 
contractual obligation not to trade. Therefore, the tipper rightfully depends 
on the tippee to not use the information for trading purposes. Under this 
analysis, a mere confidentiality agreement, short of a nonuse agreement or 
some further business relationship providing a level of authority or 
dependence by the source on the tippee, cannot be the basis for § 10(b) 
liability. 
Some have claimed that the Chestman approach to defining a 
fiduciary-like relationship sets too high a bar.184 The claim from critics of 
the Chestman approach to fiduciary-like relationships is that the intent of 
the Exchange Act is to protect investors and assure an honest securities 
market, and therefore, this definition is too restrictive.185 This argument lies 
exclusively in a policy realm. The regulatory scheme could fully protect the 
integrity of the market and the fairness of the market for individual traders 
by limiting any trading by all individuals who have material nonpublic 
 
181  See id. at 568–69. 
182  See id. at 567. 
183  Id. at 569. 
184  See SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1273 n.23 (11th Cir. 2003) (refusing to take what the Yun court 
considered to be an overly narrow approach to defining a fiduciary-like relationship). The SEC called 
Chestman’s parameters too narrow and claimed that they failed to “sufficiently protect investors and the 
securities markets from the misappropriation and resulting misuse of inside information.” Selective 
Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7787, Exchange Act Release No. 42,259, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 24,209, 71 SEC Docket 732, 749 (proposed Dec. 20, 1999) 
(proposing release of Rule 10b5-2). 
185  See Yun, 327 F.3d at 1273 n.23. 
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information. However, this is not the regulatory scheme in the United 
States.186 Access to material nonpublic information on its own is inadequate 
for establishing liability under § 10(b).187 The statute requires the use of a 
deceptive or manipulative device before insider trading liability can be 
established.188 Therefore, although courts have yet to clearly define the 
characteristics of a fiduciary-like relationship, the argument against the 
Chestman analysis that it fails to fully protect the general investor is an 
argument for an overhaul of the regulatory scheme. 
Even without relying on the definition of fiduciary-like relationship 
offered in Chestman, a mere confidentiality agreement is not sufficient to 
establish § 10(b) liability. Even a far broader definition of fiduciary-like 
relationship could not logically include the type of relationship seen in 
Cuban. The district court in Cuban offered an expanded definition of the 
type of relationship of trust or confidence needed for liability under § 10(b). 
The court understood O’Hagan to mean that a fiduciary or fiduciary-like 
relationship was sufficient, but not necessary, for establishing § 10(b) 
liability.189 The court also acknowledged that nothing in the O’Hagan 
decision would stop a contractual agreement from being sufficient to 
establish the requisite relationship for liability.190 However, the court 
explained further that a mere confidentiality agreement would be 
insufficient. In order to establish a duty, based on an agreement, to not trade 
on the information, a nonuse agreement would be necessary. Under the 
terms of a confidentiality agreement, keeping the information confidential 
but trading based on that information is not deceptive as required by 
statute.191 
The Cuban court makes an interesting but exclusively semantic 
argument. The court explains that “a duty analogous to the fiduciary’s duty 
of ‘loyalty and confidentiality’ can be created by agreement.”192 Here, the 
Cuban court defines the relationship created by an agreement as 
conceptually different from (although analogous to) a fiduciary-like 
relationship. The distinction drawn by the Cuban court is unnecessary. An 
easier conceptual approach is that a contractual nonuse agreement creates a 
fiduciary-like relationship for the purpose of § 10(b) liability. In order for 
an agreement to succeed in creating such a relationship, the resulting 
relationship must contain the elements of a fiduciary-like relationship. A 
mere confidentiality agreement, unlike a nonuse agreement, does not 
 
186  See supra Part I (providing overview of the regulatory scheme). 
187  See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 567. 
188  15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
189  SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 724 n.5 (N.D. Tex. 2009), vacated, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 
2010). 
190  Id. at 724. 
191  Id. at 725. 
192  Id. at 724. 
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provide the source of deception—a duty not to use for one’s personal 
benefit followed by trading—to establish liability. 
While the reasoning here reaches the same broad conclusion as the 
district court, there is one important difference. While the Cuban court 
suggests a new type of relationship sufficient for § 10(b) liability—one 
created by an agreement—the analysis in this Note is more consistent with 
prior case law. Rather than broadening the scope of § 10(b) by adding this 
type of relationship, this Note suggests that a nonuse agreement has the 
potential to create the requisite fiduciary-like relationship. In either 
approach, while a nonuse agreement may be sufficient for establishing 
liability, a mere confidentiality agreement would never be enough. To 
create the type of fiduciary or fiduciary-like relationship required under 
O’Hagan to find liability under § 10(b), there must be an actual duty not to 
trade. A duty to keep the information confidential is insufficient to clear the 
bar for showing the requisite duty. 
IV. SEC RULE 10B5-2(B)(1) IS AN INVALID USE OF THE SEC’S 
RULEMAKING POWER 
This Note has established that, under the current case law interpreting 
§ 10(b), a mere confidentiality agreement is insufficient to establish the 
duty necessary to meet the deception requirement.193 Despite these 
decisions, the SEC promulgated Rule 10b5-2(b)(1), which explicitly states 
that a confidentiality agreement is sufficient for creating liability under the 
misappropriation theory.194 The question then becomes whether it was 
within the SEC’s administrative authority to enact such a rule. In an amicus 
curiae brief for the court in the Cuban case, several scholars asserted that 
this is beyond the scope of the SEC’s power.195 The next section outlines the 
test under which the SEC’s rulemaking power must be measured and then 
assesses Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) under this rubric. 
A. Defining the SEC’s Rulemaking Power 
The SEC’s power under § 10(b) is not unlimited. Rather, “[t]he 
rulemaking power granted to an administrative agency charged with the 
administration of a federal statute is not the power to make law. . . . [I]t is 
the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as 
expressed by the statute.”196 The validity of an administrative agency’s rule 
is measured under the well-known test developed in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.197 
 
193  See supra Part III. 
194  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b)(1) (2011). 
195  See Amended Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 109, at 2. 
196  Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213–14 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
197  467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
106:1849 (2012) SEC v. Cuban 
 1875
First, the courts only defer to the regulatory agency’s interpretation of 
a statute if Congress has not made its intent clear in the statutory text.198 If 
Congress has not expressed a clear intent, then the court must defer to any 
reasonable interpretation of the administrative agency, rather than imposing 
its own construction.199 To make this threshold determination, the court does 
not look at the particular provision in isolation, but rather looks at it in the 
context of the overall statutory scheme.200 In a case where the statutory 
language is ambiguous and Congress has left room for an agency to further 
explain a provision, the court will defer to the administrative agency’s 
interpretation as long as the interpretation is not “arbitrary, capricious, or 
manifestly contrary to the statute.”201 
Beyond the Chevron test, in cases where the court has already 
interpreted a statute in a specific way, an administrative agency may not 
step in to change the court’s interpretation through rulemaking.202 In 
Bankers Trust New York Corp. v. United States, the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit explained: 
[W]e conclude that the Court of Federal Claims erred in holding that, on the 
facts of this case, an Executive agency regulation could effectively construe a 
statute in a manner different from a prior definitive court ruling. . . . The 
Chevron doctrine . . . is not in conflict with stare decisis . . ., which requires 
adherence to precedential decisions of this court and of our predecessor 
courts.203 
The court must adhere to precedent interpreting the statute in the face of 
agency regulations to the contrary.204 
B. Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) Analyzed Under Chevron 
Under the first prong of the Chevron test, the court must look at the 
language of the statute under which the rule is promulgated to assess 
whether the statutory language is ambiguous.205 Section 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act prohibits the use of a proscribed deceptive or manipulative 
device in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. In Santa Fe 
Industries, Inc. v. Green,206 the Supreme Court explained that securities law 
takes a narrow definition of manipulation.207 The Court explained that 
 
198  Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 665 (2007) (outlining the 
test created in Chevron). 
199  See id. at 655. 
200  See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000). 
201  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
202  See Bankers Trust N.Y. Corp. v. United States, 225 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
203  Id. 
204  See id. 
205  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
206  430 U.S. 462 (1977). 
207  See id. at 476. 
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“‘[m]anipulation’ is ‘virtually a term of art when used in connection with 
securities markets.’”208 The term manipulation refers only to activities “that 
are intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity.”209 
The Court went on to explain that this reading of the statute is based on the 
clarity of the language and the context of the statute.210 This reading of the 
word manipulation makes it easy to see that trading while under a 
confidentiality agreement is not within this definition, which the Court sees 
as unambiguous in the language of the statute. 
Deception has not been as clearly defined by the courts. In fact, in the 
context of deception, the Court recognized that “[s]ection 10(b) must be 
read flexibly, not technically and restrictively.”211 Even analyzing this 
broadly, to find liability under § 10(b), there must be deception in 
connection with the sale of a security. With this in mind, the Court 
explained that the statute requires that an individual must have a duty to 
disclose or abstain to be found liable.212 In the context of the 
misappropriation theory, the trader must be part of a fiduciary or fiduciary-
like relationship to find such a duty.213 Without such a duty to disclose or 
abstain created under a fiduciary or fiduciary-like relationship, trading 
while in possession of the information is not deceptive. 
The next question is whether a confidentiality agreement, on its own, 
creates a duty such that, by trading, the tippee has employed a deceptive 
device. If not, Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) overreaches the statutory authority of the 
SEC by creating liability under § 10(b) without the existence of deception 
or manipulation. It is unreasonable to interpret a promise not to disclose 
confidential information as a simultaneous agreement not to use that 
information (while keeping it confidential) for an individual’s personal 
benefit. The acts of disclosure and use are temporally separate acts, and it 
would be perverse to believe that, when an individual agrees not to disclose 
a piece of information, it is inherently deceitful to use that information for 
his personal benefit while maintaining confidentiality.214 This is especially 
 
208  Id. (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976)). 
209  Id. For a full discussion of the definition of the word manipulation in the context of securities 
law, see Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit “Manipulation” in Financial 
Markets?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 503, 507–10 (1991) (explaining that, although there are several 
formulations of the definition of manipulation, they are all grounded in attempts to affect market 
pricing). 
210  See Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 477. 
211  Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971). 
212  See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654–55 (1997); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 
222, 230 (1980). 
213  See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655. 
214  This Note ignores the argument that by trading, an individual may be disclosing the confidential 
information to the market. This may be true for a very large investor who gains confidential information 
and then subsequently purchases or sells large quantities of stock. This is not, on the other hand, an 
argument in favor of a blanket statement that trading while under a confidentiality agreement is 
deceitful. To look at the far other end of the spectrum, imagine an investor who only trades a single 
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true in the context of a market where individuals often agree to nonuse 
agreements on top of confidentiality agreements. Companies would not 
need nonuse agreements if, simply by agreeing to confidentiality, an 
individual was also agreeing not to trade while maintaining that 
confidentiality. 
The Supreme Court, in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, explained that 
§ 10(b) contains a scienter requirement.215 The Court reasoned that although 
willful action was not expressly required in the language of § 10(b), when 
considered in the context of the negligence standard set in § 11, the 
legislative intent for willfulness was clear.216 Considered in the context of 
the Supreme Court’s assessment that scienter is required for § 10(b) 
liability, the clarity of deceit is even more evident. One might argue that 
without a scienter requirement in the statute, what constitutes a deceitful act 
could be vague. The requirement of willful, knowing, or purposeful conduct 
requires a narrow definition of what is deceitful. It is unrealistic to suggest 
that Congress could have intended a scienter requirement as the Court 
found in Hochfelder, but would then apply a broad definition of deceit such 
that trading after agreeing only to confidentiality would be included. 
Assuming arguendo that 10b5-2(b)(1) is not contrary to the courts’ 
interpretation of the meaning of the statute, the rule does not pass the 
second prong of the Chevron test: Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) is “arbitrary, 
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”217 One could argue that 
although the statute requires deception, it does not explicitly address the 
question of what types of relationships breed a duty that can lead to the 
requisite deception. Therefore, it would be within the province of the SEC 
to respond to this question. Even in that context, the relationships that the 
SEC does define must pass the second prong of the Chevron test. It flows 
from the argument above regarding the unambiguous language of the 
statute that including mere confidentiality agreements within this structure 
is manifestly contrary to the statute. A confidentiality agreement alone fails 
to create a situation where a deceptive act is possible by trading without 
some further fiduciary or fiduciary-like relationship. Therefore, whether 
Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) is assessed under the first or second prong, it is 
unrealistic that the rule could pass the Chevron test. The rule therefore does 
not deserve deference from the courts. 
Even assuming that Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) is neither contrary to the 
unambiguous language of the statute nor manifestly contrary to the statute 
 
share based on this information. It is impossible to claim that this act somehow discloses this 
information to the market and is therefore deceitful. Since this Note involves the overall validity of the 
Rule, it is irrelevant if, in some cases, disclosure would occur due to the trading because in those cases 
there clearly would be an act of deceit. 
215  425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976). 
216  See id. at 208. 
217  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
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under the second prong, stare decisis prevents the courts from finding 
liability under 10b5-2(b)(1).218 The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
regarding § 10(b)—from Chiarella through O’Hagan—sets a clear 
standard—for § 10(b) liability, the court must find a fiduciary or fiduciary-
like relationship.219 The Supreme Court has, through these cases, explained 
how “deceptive” should be read in the context of § 10(b). Under Chiarella, 
the Court said that “[w]hen an allegation of fraud is based upon 
nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak.”220 The Court 
explained that a breach of a fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty is required by 
the plain text of the statute.221 The O’Hagan Court was also explicit in 
stating that the requirement for a fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty is 
grounded in the statute’s text.222 
Whether Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) could realistically make it past the Chevron 
test without precedent from the Supreme Court is unlikely. The 
unambiguous language of the statute requires deception that cannot be 
present when the only duty created is through a mere confidentiality 
agreement. Even if Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) were able to clear the hurdle of the 
Chevron test without the Supreme Court precedent to date, Chiarella and 
O’Hagan have already foreclosed the question of what type of relationship 
is necessary for proving deception under § 10(b). Therefore, Rule 10b5-
2(b)(1) is an invalid use of the SEC’s rulemaking power and reaches 
beyond the scope of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act. The rule cannot be used 
as the basis for § 10(b) liability for insider trading. 
 
218  See Bankers Trust N.Y. Corp. v. United States, 225 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
219  See supra Part I (outlining the Supreme Court’s history regarding the relationship requirements 
for § 10(b) liability). 
220  445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980). 
221  See id. at 234–35. 
222  United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 659 n.9 (1997); see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. 
Credit Suisse First Bos. (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372, 389 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he [Supreme] Court . . . has 
established that a device, such as a scheme, is not ‘deceptive’ unless it involves breach of some duty of 
candid disclosure.”); SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (outlining that 
O’Hagan clearly states that § 10(b) “does not reach all structural disparities in information that result in 
securities transactions, only those disparities obtained by dint of a breach of fiduciary duty of 
disclosure”), vacated, 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009). On appeal in Dorozhko, the court explained that there 
may be a situation in which a fiduciary or fiduciary-like relationship is not required for § 10(b) liability. 
See 574 F.3d at 48. This situation is when there is direct deception in the act of obtaining the 
information, rather than where there is a duty to disclose or abstain. See id. at 50. Since there is clearly 
direct fraud in that type of situation, the court does not need to take the extra step of identifying whether 
a duty exists to establish a violation. See id. This is not inconsistent with the argument in this Note 
because the appellate court did confirm in its discussion that, in a disclose-or-abstain situation, a 
fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty is still necessary. See id. 
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V. THE FUTURE OF INSIDER TRADING LIABILITY BASED EXCLUSIVELY ON 
A MERE CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT—WHAT IS REALISTIC? 
Now that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Cuban has vacated the 
motion to dismiss and remanded for discovery and trial,223 it is unlikely that 
this case will be an opportunity for the Supreme Court to face the question 
of the scope of liability under § 10(b). However, it is imperative that the 
Court respond to the SEC’s post-O’Hagan rulemaking and clarify whether 
Rule 10b5-2(b)(1)224 is a valid use of the SEC’s rulemaking power. Without 
clarification from the Supreme Court, the question of the applicability of 
§ 10(b) liability to confidentiality agreements is a likely source of a future 
circuit split regarding whether these rules are appropriate uses of the SEC’s 
rulemaking power. When such a split occurs, it is essential that the Court 
clear up this issue because predictability is essential in the context of 
securities law to promote efficient markets. 
For the sake of clarity, Congress should also take action to elucidate 
the intent of § 10(b) in the context of insider trading, although this is very 
unlikely to happen in the near future. As the SEC’s insider trading 
enforcement becomes more complicated in the post-O’Hagan era, the 
simple definition Congress provided in § 10(b) is no longer sufficient to 
provide direction for both the SEC and the courts. As trading strategies and 
technology grow more complicated, the basic idea of a company officer 
going behind the back of the corporation, disregarding his fiduciary duty, 
and trading for his personal benefit is no longer the archetype of insider 
trading. 
Unfortunately, it is unlikely that Congress will take this approach. The 
inevitable minefield that comes with either position on this issue makes it 
so politically sensitive that the legislature will likely allow the SEC and the 
courts to reach a solution. By taking the position that a confidentiality 
agreement is not sufficient grounds for insider trading liability, a 
congressman could be perceived as supporting elite individuals who, short 
of a fiduciary relationship, are able to obtain access to information that an 
average trader would never be able to obtain. On the other hand, by 
strengthening insider trading law and extending regulations to cover such a 
relationship, a legislator could also anger powerful constituents with the 
wealth and influence to gain the type of information that Cuban was able to 
obtain. Realistically, it is a no-win situation for any legislator and is 
therefore unlikely to ever be introduced by a member of Congress, let alone 
make it out of committee. 
 
223  SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010). 
224  Rule 10b5-1 and the remainder of Rule 10b5-2 have also been questioned as to their validity 
under § 10(b). For a discussion of the validity of Rule 10b5-1, see Allan Horwich, The Origin, 
Application, Validity, and Potential Misuse of Rule 10b5-1, 62 BUS. LAW. 913, 943–49 (2007). 
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The broader question that must be asked is what should be the 
appropriate scope of § 10(b) liability in the context of confidentiality 
agreements. Some top economists have suggested that insider trading law 
should be far less restrictive than the current law. Arguments include the 
promotion of strong market efficiency and the administrative costs 
associated with insider trading enforcement. Many even claim that insider 
trading impacts the market positively by bringing information to the surface 
more quickly.225 Milton Friedman, laureate of the Nobel Memorial Prize in 
Economics, said: “You want more insider trading, not less. You want to 
give the people most likely to have knowledge about deficiencies of the 
company an incentive to make the public aware of that.”226 
Despite the possible benefits of insider trading to the market,227 this 
Note focuses exclusively on why the prohibition on insider trading should 
not be extended to mere confidentiality agreements. As established early in 
this Note, the intent of § 10(b) is to promote full disclosure of inside 
information for the protection of the average investor and to promote fair 
dealing in securities trading.228 The goal of the statute is to protect the 
average securities trader and to promote honesty in the securities market. In 
evaluating this issue, one must be conscious of the balance that any 
approach would have on the honesty of the securities market with the 
broader impact that it could have on the securities markets as a whole. 
It is generally accepted in modern economics that market liquidity is an 
essential aspect of modern financial markets.229 Although it would be 
extreme to suggest that a rule extending insider trading liability to 
relationships born merely out of a confidentiality agreement would have a 
considerable impact on the liquidity of securities markets, it is also 
unrealistic to think that it would have no impact. The individuals trading 
large quantities of securities on the markets are often the same people with 
access to the types of material nonpublic information that Cuban did. With 
the extension of insider trading law to these types of relationships, it is a 
valid fear that this may induce a trend toward excessive enforcement on any 
trading done with knowledge of material nonpublic information. Once the 
current requirement for deception falls off the table, an investor is 
 
225  See, e.g., James Altucher, Should Insider Trading Be Made Legal?, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 20, 
2009, 6:51 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-altucher/should-insider-trading-be_b_324409.
html (suggesting that while insider trading should be illegal, there could be benefits from legalization). 
226  Interview by Michelle Caruso-Cabrera with Milton Friedman, Power Lunch: Trust Markets to 
Weed Out Corporate Wrongdoers (CNBC television broadcast Mar. 12, 2003). 
227  For a discussion of some of the arguments for legalizing the practice, see MANNE, supra note 26, 
at 235–255. 
228  See Williams, supra note 25, at 411–12. 
229  For a general overview of the role that market liquidity plays in financial markets, see Timothy 
F. Geithner, Liquidity and Financial Markets, Keynote Address at the 8th Annual Risk Convention and 
Exhibition, Global Association of Risk Professionals, New York City (Feb. 28, 2007), available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2007/gei070228.html. 
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inevitably going to be afraid to trade any time he has this type of 
information. Therefore, the impact to market liquidity could be substantial. 
In this context, weighing the potential positive impact toward honesty 
in the market against the potential negative impact to the securities market, 
it seems clear that the better option is to maintain the current line by 
requiring deception for § 10(b) liability. It is, realistically, a small number 
of people who have a confidentiality agreement in place without any further 
relationship that creates the fiduciary or fiduciary-like relationships required 
by Chiarella and O’Hagan. Therefore the extension of insider trading 
liability to these individuals would have a minimal impact on market 
honesty. On the other hand, the impact that sending such a message could 
have on the willingness of individuals with access to material nonpublic 
information to trade, even when such trading would not be deceptive, could 
have a noticeable impact on market liquidity. This is a harm far 
outweighing the minor constructive impact. 
So what is the realistic future of insider trading liability under § 10(b) 
based solely on a confidentiality agreement? Legislative action by Congress 
to clarify the scope of the law would be the best course of action; however, 
for the reasons above, this solution is unlikely. Instead, the SEC will 
continue to push the bounds of § 10(b) enforcement and will potentially 
create a disparate set of case law in the lower courts until the Supreme 
Court chooses to take on this issue. It is only for time to tell whether the 
Supreme Court will find it appropriate to provide a wide enough berth of 
deference to the SEC to sustain the validity of Rule 10b5-2(b)(1). 
CONCLUSION 
Liability under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act should not extend to 
relationships based solely on a confidentiality agreement. To date, the 
Supreme Court’s insider trading jurisprudence requires a fiduciary or 
fiduciary-like duty that is not created by a simple agreement to keep 
information confidential. The SEC attempted to circumvent these rulings by 
enacting Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) in 2000, but this rule reaches beyond the scope 
of the SEC’s rulemaking power under § 10(b) and should not be afforded 
Chevron deference by the courts. Further, the extension of liability to such 
relationships would create more negative consequences for securities 
markets than have a positive influence on market honesty. Whether it ends 
up being the legislature or the courts that have the final say on whether 
these relationships are sufficient for liability, this is not an issue that is 
likely to go away any time soon. 
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